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Abstract—In recent years, malware (malicious software) has 
greatly evolved and has become very sophisticated. The evolution 
of malware makes it difficult to detect using traditional 
signature-based malware detectors. Thus, researchers have 
proposed various behavior-based malware detection techniques 
to mitigate this problem. However, there are still serious 
shortcomings, related to scalability and computational 
complexity, in existing malware behavior modeling techniques. 
This raises questions about the practical applicability of these 
techniques.  
This paper proposes and evaluates a bounded feature space 
behavior modeling (BOFM) framework for scalable malware 
detection. BOFM models the interactions between software 
(which can be malware or benign) and security-critical OS 
resources in a scalable manner. Information collected at run-time 
according to this model is then used by machine learning 
algorithms to learn how to accurately classify software as 
malware or benign. One of the key problems with simple 
malware behavior modeling (e.g., n-gram model) is that the 
number of malware features (i.e., signatures) grows proportional 
to the size of execution traces, with a resulting malware feature 
space that is so large that it makes the detection process very 
challenging. On the other hand, in BOFM, the malware feature 
space is bounded by an upper limit N, a constant, and the results 
of our experiments show that its computation time and memory 
usage are vastly lower than in currently reported, malware 
detection techniques, while preserving or even improving their 
high detection accuracy. 
 
Index Terms—Malware detection, Malware behavior modeling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Exponential growth of malware (malicious software) is a 
major threat in the software industry. Symantec, an anti-
malware vendor, reported that more than 403 million new 
malware variants were created in 2011, a 41% increase over 
2010 [25]. At the same time, targeted attacks, such as Stuxnet 
and Duqu, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) also 
showed a steady increase in recent years [25]. Despite the 
widespread use and availability of various anti-malware 
(commonly known as anti-virus) tools, the growth of malware 
is phenomenal. It is observed that malware has greatly 
evolved, where new malware has become very sophisticated 
and is designed to avoid traditional anti-virus signatures, using 
various obfuscation techniques [6]. 
Given the alarming growth of malware, a significant 
amount of research has focused on proposing various malware 
detection techniques to mitigate this problem. We can divide 
these techniques into two broad categories: static (or 
signature-based) and dynamic (or behavior-based) malware 
detection. Signature-based malware detection has an 
advantage over behavior-based analysis since it examines the 
static content of the malicious binary and thus, is able to 
achieve full code coverage. In addition, using signatures, it is 
even possible to detect malicious applications before they are 
executed. However, the major limitation of signature-based 
malware detection is that it can be easily evaded by basic 
obfuscation techniques. Further, malware authors can change 
the syntactic characteristics (i.e., structure) of a malicious 
program without changing its semantics (i.e., behavior) [4, 
22]. Unfortunately, signature-based malware detection is still 
the predominant detection method today [20]. 
To overcome the limitations of signature-based malware 
detection, security researchers have proposed various behavior 
-based malware detection techniques [5, 8, 14, 19, 20] that 
focus on the semantics of the malicious application. In 
particular, these techniques examine the run-time behavior of 
the malicious binary and analyze the system calls (e.g., Win32 
and native API functions) invoked during execution, in order 
to model its malicious behavior. The key behavior-based 
malware modeling techniques include: bags of system calls 
[5], sequence of system calls such as n-gram model [19, 5], 
individual system call analysis [14], behavioral graphs [8] and 
system call dependency graphs [20].  
However, one of the key issues in existing behavior-based 
malware modeling techniques is that the scalability of these 
approaches is highly problematic. Here, scalability refers to 
the size of malware features (or signatures) extracted from an 
execution trace. For example, even a simple model such as 
bags of system calls, generates a number of malware features 
that grows proportionally to the size of execution traces [5]. 
This makes the detection process impractical as huge feature 
spaces make the learning process computationally intensive 
and detection might be negatively affected if most of these 
features are irrelevant. In addition to the scalability of feature 
spaces, unacceptably high computational complexity and 
memory consumption are also expected to impact the 
practicality and efficiency of a malware detector. As a result, 
practical applications of complex malware behavior modeling 
techniques, such as system call dependency graph and 
behavioral graph, are very limited in practice. For example, in 
[20], it is reported that it took 12-48 hours to extract malware 
specifications from a network worm using a graph mining 
algorithm.    
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a simple yet 
efficient malware behavior modeling technique—called 
BOFM—that systematically captures the interactions between 
malware and security-critical system resources in a scalable 
manner, at an adequate level of abstraction. In BOFM, 
scalability is achieved through constructing an upper-bounded 
malware feature space with a predetermined value N 
(discussed in Section IV). In other words, BOFM can extract 
malware features that do not grow in proportion with the 
number of program samples under examination. In addition, 
BOFM is resilient against basic obfuscation techniques [6].  
As BOFM is both accurate and efficient, it can be used to 
complement traditional anti-virus tools by leveraging on 
BOFM features to accurately detect malware at the end host. 
Indeed, our results show that, when combined with machine 
learning techniques, BOFM is not only at least as accurate as 
existing malware detection techniques, but its computation 
times (e.g., for matching signatures) and memory consumption 
are vastly lower as well, thus making it a much more practical 
and scalable approach.  
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: 
 We propose a malware behaviour modelling technique 
(called BOFM) that captures malicious interactions be-
tween malware and security-critical OS resources in a 
scalable manner. This is in turn combined with machine 
learning techniques for automated malware detection. 
 
 We conducted and report an experiment involving 5300 
malware and 100 benign samples collected from various 
sources. Our experimental results show that BOFM, when 
combined with appropriate machine learning classifiers, 
can achieve 99.4% malware detection rate with no false 
positives, the latter being important in our context. 
 
 We show that the feature space generated by BOFM is of 
fixed dimension, does not grow with the number of mal-
ware samples under examination, and is three orders of 
magnitude smaller than with the best reported techniques 
for malware behaviour modelling. As a result, computa-
tion times and memory usage for extracting program fea-
tures and malware detection are vastly decreased.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes 
the related work and our motivation. Section III gives an 
overview of our behavior modeling technique. Section IV 
defines our bounded feature space behavior modeling 
technique. Section V describes the feature vector construction. 
Section VI presents the detection method. Section VII 
describes the experimental design. Section VIII summarizes 
and discusses the experimental results. Finally, Section IX 
concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATIONS 
Past research includes several useful techniques for 
malware detection. In this section, we shall present related 
research works and discuss the pros and cons of these 
approaches. 
The recent study on behavior-based malware detection 
reported by Canali et al. [5] is most relevant to our current 
work. In [5], the authors have done a comprehensive study on 
analyzing the efficiency of various malware behavior 
modeling techniques. They organized the behavior models 
based on three dimensions: (1) the granularity of basic model 
elements (i.e., system calls at various levels of abstraction, 
such as with and without parameters), (2) the relationship 
among basic model elements, such as n-gram, m-bag and k-
tuple1 and, (3) cardinality of each specification (i.e., values of 
n, m and k). A series of more than 200 experiments were 
conducted on a large set of malware and benign samples to 
systematically identify the optimal behavior model for 
malware detection. Their experiment results revealed that the 
optimal behavior model, 2-bags of 2-tuples of action with 
arguments, achieved a 99% detection rate with only a 0.4% 
false positive rate.  
Though the above results are very encouraging, there are 
several shortcomings associated with this approach. The most 
important issue is that the scalability of this approach is highly 
problematic. The behavior modeling techniques such as n-
gram, m-bag and k-tuple can easily generate huge feature 
spaces. For example, from an execution trace with 400 unique 
system calls, more than 10 million features are constructed 
using m-bag model with a bag cardinality of 3 (m=3) . This 
problem is even worse in tuple-based behavior models. In [5], 
it is also reported that the memory consumption is one of the 
major threat to practical implementation of this approach, 
where on a standard machine (Intel Dual Core 2.66 GHz with 
4GB of RAM) the prototype malware detector consumed 1GB 
of RAM for 5 million malware signatures. Further, it is also 
reported that feature extraction from malware samples is itself 
a computationally intensive task, where almost 2 days of 
computation are required for tuples of system calls with 
arguments model. 
In addition, the approach in [5] requires several parameter 
tunings for optimal performance that makes it less practical. 
Moreover, it is observed that intensive parameter tuning is 
often associated with overfitting problems. For example, to 
manage the huge feature space, authors have proposed a 
feature pruning mechanism. A malware feature is discarded if 
it is not general enough (i.e., doesn’t detect at least five 
malwares) or too redundant (i.e., not represented by 20,000 
other signatures), where the values 5 and 20,000 are arbitrarily 
selected. Further, there is a trade-off in selecting the 
cardinality of a specification (e.g., number of basic model 
elements in a bag), where increasing the cardinality may result 
in a high detection rate but also lead to overfitting. For 
example, in [5], it is reported that detection rates achieved by 
tuple-based behavior models are highly sensitive to 
                                                          
1 Please refer to [5] for definitions of n-gram, m-bag and k-tuple models  
cardinality. Finally, the alert threshold, the number of malware 
signatures that need to be matched to flag an unknown 
program as malware, significantly influences the detection rate 
and false positive rate. In [5], it is shown that small alert 
threshold results in high detection and false positive rate and 
vice versa. Thus, choosing the appropriate values for these 
parameters is crucial but complex in practice. 
Apart from [5], there are several other behavior-based 
malware modeling techniques proposed in the literature. Lanzi 
et al. [19] proposed AccessMiner, a malware detection 
technique based on system-centric malware models, where the 
interaction between benign sample and the OS resources is 
modeled in a system-centric manner. This addresses the 
limitation of program-centric approaches. Further, authors 
empirically proved the inefficiencies of n-gram based malware 
behavior modeling. In addition to generic malware detection 
[15, 13], system call and library call based behavior modeling 
is also proposed to detect more specific class of malware, such 
as spyware (Kirda et al. [21]) and botnets (Stinson et al. [16]) 
detection. 
Kolbitsch et al. [8] proposed an efficient and effective 
malware detection approach at the end host, where it models 
the malware behavior as a graph and detection is done at the 
end host using graph matching. Similarly, Fredrikson et al. 
[20] proposed malware specification mining using dependency 
graphs. They managed to achieve a higher detection rate than 
two commercial behavior-based malware detectors. However, 
graph mining still remains very computationally intensive, 
where it is reported that it took around 12-48 hours to extract 
malware specification from certain network worms. In 
addition, the dataset used in most of these approaches are very 
limited. For example, Kolbitsch et al. [8] used only 563 
malware samples and 10 benign samples, similarly, 
Christodorescu et al. [13] used 16 malware and 6 benign 
samples, Stinson et al. [16] used 6 malware and 9 benign 
samples, and Martignoni et al. [15] used only 7 malware and 6 
benign samples for evaluation. 
We derive the following key observations based on the 
abovementioned, behavior-based malware detection 
approaches [5, 19, 8, 13, 16, 15]:  
 
 The practicality and efficiency of malware detection 
techniques are characterized on four dimensions:  the 
size of feature space, computational complexity, over-
head in terms of additional pre-processing activities, 
and detection accuracy.   
 Simple malware behaviour models such as n-gram, m-
bag and k-tuple, generate huge feature spaces and re-
quire various pruning and parameter tuning mecha-
nisms to alleviate the problem.  
 More complex malware behaviour models, such as de-
pendency and behavioural graphs are, generally, highly 
computationally and data intensive.  
 
In the next two sections, we explain our proposed 
approach, Bounded Feature space behavior Modeling 
(BOFM), which aims at making malware detection scalable, 
efficient, and practical, while retaining or improving the high 
accuracy reported thus far in the literature. 
III. OVERVIEW 
Malwares usually achieve their objectives through 
performing malicious actions on security-critical, operating 
system resources. An action corresponds to a high-level 
operation (e.g., reading a file) that is composed of a set of 
related system calls to achieve an externally meaningful 
objective [3, 5]. For example, reading a file may require two 
system calls: (1) NtOpenFile to open the file, and (2) 
NtReadFile to read the file content. The main advantage of 
using actions over system calls is that different versions of the 
same operating system (e.g., Windows 2000 and Windows 
XP) may use different names for system calls that are in fact 
serving the same purpose [3] and, as a result, analyzing system 
calls directly may result in dealing with unnecessarily large 
amounts of data. For example, in Windows OS, the system 
calls NtCreateProcess and NtCreateProcessEx are both used 
to create a new process. Thus, these two system calls can be 
mapped to a single action called CreateProcess. System call 
sequences can be mapped to actions using a mapping 
algorithm [7]. There are a number of different mapping 
algorithms used in the malware research community. 
Depending on the algorithm used, the system call sequence 
   NtOpenFile, NtReadFile     can be mapped to two distinct 
actions OpenFile and ReadFile, respectively, or both system 
calls can be combined to represent a single action ReadFile.  
In the remainder of this section, we first discuss the 
various types of OS resources and then, we introduce and 
illustrate our behavior modeling technique by using an 
example.  
A. Operating System Resource Types 
The analysis of malicious behavior is usually carried out 
through examining the actions it performs on security-critical 
system resources. In the literature, researchers usually model 
malware behavior based on its interaction with certain types of 
OS resources, such as file system, registry, process and 
network. For example, Kolbitsch et al. [8] considered security-
relevant system calls associated with file system, registry, 
network, process and system services for malware detection, 
whereas in our previous work [9], we considered the actions 
performed on four security-critical OS resource types such as 
file system, registry, process and network, for malware 
clustering.  Based on the broad classification of system calls 
reported in [28] and Windows OS internals [10], we have 
considered the following OS resource types in our study: file 
system, registry, process, thread, section, network and 
synchronization. Next, we shall briefly describe each of these 
OS resource types. 
 
 File System. Operating system and the programs that run 
on it are made up of individual files.  A file is an in-
stance of any opened file or I/O device.  
 Registry. Registry is a system-defined database in which 
applications and system components store and retrieve 
configuration data [29]. 
 Process and Thread.  Process is the virtual address 
space  and  control  information  necessary  for  the exe-
cution  of  a  set  of  threads   One or more threads run in 
the context of such process [27]. 
 Network. This corresponds to the network related activi-
ties of the program being executed. 
 Synchronization. This aims to protect shared resources 
from simultaneous access by multiple threads or proc-
esses [31]. 
 Section. Section represents a portion of memory that can 
be shared, where a process can use section to share parts 
of its memory address space with other processes [32]. 
 
We model malicious behavior based on the sets of actions 
that malware performs on individual OS resource instances. 
An OS resource instance corresponds to an identifier (or 
instance) of an OS resource type. For example, for File 
System, file names (e.g., C:\foo.exe and C:\Windows\abc 
.dll ) are identifiers and the actions performed on each of these 
file instances include OpenFile, ReadFile, and DeleteFile. A 
comprehensive list of actions that a malware can perform on 
each OS resource type is given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: OS RESOURCES AND CORRESPONDING ACTIONS 
OS Resource 
Types 
# of 
Actions 
List of Actions 
 
File system 14 
CreateDirectory, QueryDirectory, 
CreateFile, SetFileInformation, 
UnLockFile, LockFile, OpenFile,  
WriteFile, QueryFileAttributes, 
QueryFileVolume, DeleteFile, ReadFile 
DeviceControl, QueryFileInformation 
Registry 7 
CreateKey, DeleteKey, DeleteValue,  
SetValue, OpenKey, NotifyChangeKey 
QueryValue 
Process/Thread 6 
SetInformationProcesses, Create-
Process, CreateThread, OpenProcess, 
KillProcess, QueryInformationProcess 
Synchronization 6 
CreateMutex, OpenSemaphore, 
CreateSemaphore,  OpenMutex, 
ReleaseMutex, ReleaseSemaphore 
Network 1 NetworkConnection 
Section 4 
OpenSection, CreateSection, 
QuerySection, MapViewOfSectoin 
  
Next, we shall present an example to illustrate our 
behavior modeling technique. This example is used as a 
running example in this paper. 
B. Example 
A sample malware execution trace is given in Figure 1, 
where system calls are already mapped to high-level actions. 
In a real world scenario, a single malware execution trace can 
contain several thousands of actions. However, to keep it 
simple, we have only considered few file and registry related 
actions in this example. The behavior of our pseudo malware 
is given below: 
 Creates a malicious executable along with three other 
dummy files. 
 Reads two system files and a dummy file several 
times. 
 Creates a registry key and sets its value. 
 Deletes all the dummy files. 
 
1: CreateFile("C:\Windows\malicious.exe") 
2: CreateFile("C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt") 
3: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt") 
4: CreateFile("C:\Windows\dummy2.dll") 
5: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\sysfile1.ini") 
6: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\sysfile2.dll") 
7: CreateKey("HKLM\Software\...\...\key") 
8: SetValue("HKLM\Software\...\...\key", value) 
9: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt") 
10: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt") 
11: DeleteFile("C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt") 
12: CreateFile("D:\Personel\dummy3.exe") 
13: DeleteFile("D:\Personel\dummy3.exe") 
14: DeleteFile("C:\Windows\dummy2.dll") 
15: ReadFile("C:\Windows\...\sysfile2.dll") 
Fig.1. Sample malware execution trace 
 TABLE 2: EXTRACTED MALWARE FEATURES 
Id Features (Action set) OS Resource Instances 
 
1 {CreateKey, SetValue} HKLM\Software\...\...\key 
2 {CreateFile} C:\Windows\malicious.exe 
3 
{CreateFile, ReadFile, 
DeleteFile} 
C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt 
4 {ReadFile} 
C:\Windows\...\sysfile1.ini, 
C:\Windows\...\sysfile2.dll 
5 {CreateFile, DeleteFile} 
C:\Windows\dummy2.dll, 
D:\Personel\dummy3.exe 
 
Table 2 shows in column 2 the five extracted features from 
the sample malware execution trace shown in Figure 1. As we 
will see in the next section, features are action sets, that is, fea-
tures are constructed by grouping related actions performed by 
malware on individual OS resource instances, where related 
actions refers to actions belonging to the same OS resource 
type. Column 3, in Table 2, shows the OS resource instances 
on which features are performed. For example, the action set 
{CreateFile, ReadFile, DeleteFile} is performed on a file re-
source C:\Windows\...\dummy1.txt (Id-3) and action set 
{ReadFile} is performed on two different OS resource instanc-
es C:\Windows\...\sysfile1.ini and C:\Windows\...\sysfile2. 
dll (Id-4). In Table 2, Id 2-5 represent malware features corre-
sponding to File System and Id-1 represents a feature corre-
sponding to Registry. It is important to note that OS resource 
instances (column 3 in Table 2) are only used to identify relat-
ed actions and are not included in the feature vectors used to 
support malware detection (Section V). This is due to the fact 
that malware tend to use random file names, mutex values and 
registry key values each time they execute and, therefore, 
there is no agreed-upon mechanism to generalize these highly 
volatile artifacts [19].  
Next, we shall precisely define our malware behavior 
modeling technique, BOFM, and explain its properties. 
IV. BOUNDED FEATURE SPACE BEHAVIOUR MODELLING 
(BOFM) 
A malware perform various actions on one or more OS 
resource instances. In the proposed BOFM, for each type of 
OS resources, the set of related actions performed by malware 
on an individual resource instance constitutes a feature of the 
malware. That is, in our example (see Section III.B), the set of 
related actions: {CreateKey, SetValue}, performed by malware 
on a registry instance: HKLM\Software\...\...\key, constitutes 
a feature (Id-1). In total, five features are extracted (see 
column 2 in Table 2) from the malware execution trace shown 
in Figure 1. 
Due to our modeling preference, BOFM features hold the 
following three key properties; 
 
Property 1: Regardless of the number of times an action is 
performed, if the same set of actions is performed on OS 
resource instances of the same type, this leads to identical 
malware features. For instance, in our example, ReadFile 
action is performed only once on file instance 
C:\Windows\...\sysfile1.ini and twice on file instance 
C:\Windows\...\sysfile2.dll; however, these two 
behaviors are considered to be identical and are represented 
by a single malware feature {ReadFile} (Id-4).  
 
Property 2: The sequence, in which the actions are performed, 
by malware, is ignored in feature construction. That is, in 
our example, malware read the contents of system file: 
C:\Windows\...\sysfile1.ini way ahead of creating file: 
D:\Personel\dummy3.exe, however, this information 
(i.e., sequence) is not captured by BOFM features. In 
addition, ordering of actions in an action set is also 
ignored. That is, features {ReadFile, QueryFileInformat- 
ion} and {QueryFileInformation, ReadFile} are 
considered identical.    
 
Property 3: Identical action sets which are performed on two 
different OS resource instances of same type are modeled 
as a single feature. In our example, action set {CreateFile, 
DeleteFile} is modeled as a single malware feature even 
though it is performed on two different file resource 
instances; C:\Windows\dummy2.dll and D:\Personel 
\dummy3.exe (Id-5).  
 
Next, we shall formally derive the upper-bound for malware 
features constructed using BOFM. 
 
Upper-bound. Let us assume there are   types of OS 
resources and for each OS resource type   (     ), the 
possible actions that a program can perform are always 
predefined and fixed. The list actions considered for each OS 
resource type in Table 1 is a representative example. Thus, the 
total number    of possible actions that a malware may 
perform on a resource instance of type   is a constant.  
Consequently, the maximum number    of possible features 
(or action sets) with regard to OS resource type   is also a 
constant and can be computed as follows:  
                       
  
 +   
  
 +   
  
 + … +    
  
            (1) 
Where,    
   
   
         
           Therefore, as a 
result of applying BOFM, the total number of possible 
features , extracted from all resource types, is always the 
following constant: 
                                           
 
   
                                     
From equation (2), it can be seen that the total number of 
features of a malware depends only on the total number of OS 
resource types and the number of possible actions performed 
on each OS resource type.  
Based on the number of actions considered for File System 
(Table 1), using equation (1), the maximum possible number 
of malware features that can be extracted is   
  +   
     
   
         . Similarly, the maximum possible number of 
malware features extracted for various resources are: registry: 
127, network: 1, process/thread: 63, synchronization: 63 and 
section: 15. Finally, using equation (2), the total number of 
malware features (N) that can be extracted from these six OS 
resource types sums up to 16,652. It’s worth noting that the 
value of N, calculated above, is specific to this study. In 
practice, it will vary based on the number of OS resource types 
and list of actions considered in a given context. 
Hence, in contrast to existing approaches in which the 
feature space grows in direct proportion to number of malware 
instances under examination, the total number of possible 
features for malware detection under our approach has an 
upper bound   (N=16,652). That is, our approach has a 
bounded feature space and this is expected to improve the 
scalability of malware behavior modeling. Further, we 
observed that malwares often perform a combination of 
actions that are not normally performed by benign 
applications. This behavior is captured by the hypothesis 
below.  
 
Hypothesis (Action set characterization). To achieve 
malicious objectives, malware tend to perform sets of actions, 
on a number of OS resource types that are significantly 
different from benign applications. 
 
Rationale. Obfuscation techniques, such as dead-code 
injection, subroutine reordering, instruction substitution and 
code transposition, are widely used to evade traditional, 
signature-based malware detection [6]. It is observed that 
malware authors often: (1) reorder independent actions2 [13], 
and (2) repeat certain actions many times [30], e.g., perform 
ReadFile action in a loop, to break the byte sequence (or code 
pattern) without affecting the semantics of the program to fool 
byte (or action) sequence-based malware detection techniques. 
Therefore, accounting for the sequence of actions in behavior 
modeling may have the adverse effect of failing to capture 
identical, high-level behavior with different action sequence. 
In addition, as opposed to sets, sequences of actions, similar to 
                                                          
2 These actions are independent from others and any permutation of these ac-
tions will lead to the same end behavior [13] 
n-gram, would result in a huge feature space and thus, would 
be much less scalable. Thus, we modeled the malware 
behavior as a set of actions, in contrast to sequences, to 
overcome the above mentioned obfuscation techniques. The 
advantage of using set in malware behavior modeling is 
twofold: (1) repeated actions are ignored (property 1), and (2) 
agnostic to reordering of independent actions (property 2). 
Though it is noted that there is a trade-off in using sets as the 
ordering of actions may constitute valuable information, in 
practice, malware authors often use obfuscation techniques 
that render this information useless. Further, OS resource 
instances (column 3 in Table 2) are not considered for 
malware detection as they are highly volatile (i.e., involve 
randomness) and there is no agreed-upon mechanism to 
generalize these highly volatile artifacts such as file names, 
mutex values and IP addresses [19] (property 3).  
V. CONSTRUCTION OF FEATURE VECTORS 
In this section, we explain how we extract malware 
features from execution traces and embed them in feature 
vectors. 
A. Collecting Execution Traces 
The run-time behavior of malware instances are monitored 
using a Sandbox, which is a dynamic malware analysis tool 
such as CWSandbox [1], Anubis [2], and Cuckoo Sandbox 
[12]. These systems execute programs in a controlled 
environment, monitor their behavior, and generate behavior 
reports. These reports generally contain high-level, action 
based malware behavioral characteristics [1] such as newly 
created/modified/deleted file details, registry keys, and network 
traffic details. Few sandboxes, such as Cuckoo sandbox [12], 
also provide low-level behavioral characteristics (i.e., Win32 
and native API functions based). In such cases, system calls 
can be mapped to relevant high-level actions using an 
appropriate mapping algorithm [7].  It is also noted that system 
calls can be used to model malware behavior but, as mentioned 
earlier, one must be aware of different system calls serving the 
same purpose (e.g., NtCreateProcess and NtCreateProcess-
Ex).  
B. Extraction of Features  
 Feature extraction from an execution trace involves three 
steps. They are as follows: 
Step 1: OS resource instances present in the execution trace 
are identified.  
Step 2: Related actions3 corresponding to an OS resource 
instance are grouped, forming action sets. 
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until all the OS resource instances   
identified in Step 1 are covered.  
Each unique action set, constructed in Step 2, constitute a 
feature (see Section III.B). Similar to other approaches [9, 11], 
we use feature vector to embed the extracted malware features. 
Next, we shall explain feature vector construction. 
                                                          
3 Related actions refer to actions belonging to the same OS resource type. 
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Malware 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Fig. 2. Feature vector 
C. N-dimensional Feature Vector 
For each malware, once the malware features are extracted 
(column 2 in Table 2) from the execution traces, we embed 
them in an N-component (or N-dimensional) feature vector, 
where N is the total number of possible features (equation 2). 
Each component in a feature vector is designated to represent 
a possible malware feature. We re-emphasize that OS resource 
identifiers are only used to identify related actions and are not 
part of feature vectors. Figure 2 depicts a feature vector 
constructed using malware features (column 2 in Table 2) 
extracted from execution traces shown in Figure 1. In a feature 
vector, the n
th
 component represents feature n (denoted by Fn) 
and each feature is assigned a value ‘1’ or ‘0’ to denote the 
presence (i.e., active) or absence of that feature, respectively. 
‘Active’ features4 refer to those features present in a malware 
or benign program.   
It is also noted that extracting features from benign 
programs exactly follows the same process as explained 
above, except that it is executed on a real-world machine 
instead of a sandbox to collect representative execution traces. 
In addition, the length of benign feature vectors is also upper-
bounded by a constant N (equation (2)). To summarize, each 
malware and benign application is converted into an N-
dimensional binary feature vector, in our case N=16,652. 
VI. DETECTION METHOD 
Based on our analysis of related work (Section II), we find 
that not many behavior-based malware detection frameworks 
adopt Machine Learning classification techniques to build 
detection engines. This is may be due to the fact that when the 
feature space is extremely large, the learning process will be 
computationally intensive and negatively affected if most of 
the features are irrelevant. In contrast, due to its limited feature 
space, BOFM is amenable to the use of Machine Learning 
(ML) classification techniques for building Malware Detection 
models. In our approach, Machine Learning classifiers are 
used to classify unknown software as either malware or 
benign. We tried and compared a number of ML classification 
techniques and report here on the results with Logistic 
Regression (LR) [18] and Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
[23]. The latter is reported as it is a recent technique, that has 
shown to work well in a number of applications, is based on a 
non-probabilistic theory about learning structures in data, and 
yields the best results in our particular case. The former is a 
standard probabilistic technique that yields regression models 
                                                          
4 In the following sections of the paper, when we refer to ‘features’ extracted 
by BOFM, we implicitly refer to ‘active’ features, unless otherwise stated. 
The number of active features is always less than or equal to N.  
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which are easy to interpret; in particular to assess what 
features are statistically significant predictors of malware.  
The malware detection process includes two phases: model 
building and model evaluation. During the model building 
phase, a training-set of benign and malware feature vectors is 
used by the ML algorithm to build a classifier. The model 
evaluation phase aims at assessing the classifier accuracy in a 
realistic fashion. By analyzing the actual classification (benign 
or malware) of feature vectors present in the training-set, an 
ML algorithm generates a trained classifier, e.g., a logistic 
regression equation with estimated parameter values. Next, 
during the model evaluation phase, a test-set, of benign and 
malware feature vectors, is classified by the trained classifier. 
Based on classification results, the performance of the 
classifier is evaluated by computing standard accuracy 
evaluation criteria. Note that computing such criteria requires 
the actual class labels of feature vectors in the test-set in order 
to compare the actual class with the class predicted by the 
trained classifier [24].  
VII. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
To evaluate the effectiveness of BOFM in distinguishing 
between malicious and benign behaviors, we performed a 
large set of experiments. In the following sub-sections, we 
describe the datasets used in our experiments and describe the 
evaluation criteria used to evaluate our malware predictions.  
A. Experimental dataset 
We used three different datasets in our experiments. The 
first dataset (called malware-train) is a collection of execution 
traces of 5,000 malware samples obtained from the Anubis [2] 
database. Similarly, the second dataset (called malware-test) 
contains execution traces of 300 malware samples that are 
collected on a machine that is not used to run Anubis [2]. It is 
noted that these two datasets, malware-test and malware-
train, are obtained from Canali et al. [5]. The final dataset 
(called benign) contains the execution traces of 100 benign 
samples collected from five different real-world machines 
(PCs), where each machine ran 20 benign programs. Obtaining 
execution traces from various machines, for both benign and 
malware programs, helps lower the chances that machine 
specific artifacts influence the final outcome [5].  
The benign dataset consists of applications that are 
commonly used by a standard user (e.g., MS Word, Firefox) 
and that are mostly interactive applications. Thus, following 
the approach in [20], we obtained representative execution 
traces by simulating the user interaction with the application 
for around 15-20 minutes.  For example, for a word processor 
application (i.e., MS Word), we created a new document 
including text, images and diagrams and saved it to disk, used 
several MS word plug-ins, such as EndNote, and opened few 
already existing documents. Similarly, for a web browser (e.g., 
Firefox,), we connected to our university webpage 
(www.ntu.edu.sg) and downloaded few documents from the 
site, uploaded few files the server, sent an e-mail using Gmail, 
and used several browser plug-ins such as adBlock and PDF 
Viewer. Likewise, for all interactive benign applications, we 
performed a set of required operations to get representative 
execution traces. It is important to note that to be consistent 
with malware execution traces obtained using Anubis [2], we 
selected the same subset of system calls, as used in Anubis [2], 
from the benign execution traces. 
In addition, to ascertain whether and explain why a 15-
minute simulated user interaction (with a benign application) 
is good enough to represent real-world user behavior in terms 
of BOFM features, we conducted a simple experiment. We 
compared a representative execution trace of MS Word 
application (monitored for eight hours) obtained from a real-
world machine with an execution trace of same application but 
with simulated user interaction. The findings are summarized 
in Table 3.  
From Table 3, it can be seen that the execution trace 
obtained using real-world user interactions (trace A) is larger 
in size and has a larger number of system calls than the 
execution trace with simulated user interaction (trace B). 
However, the number of features extracted using BOFM is 
larger for trace B than for trace A. This shows that in real-
world, people often tend to use a small fraction of operations 
(e.g., intuitive operations) and thus generate large execution 
traces with limited number of useful features. Hence, in order 
to get real and representative execution traces for an 
application, and thus build accurate malware predictors, one 
should simulate the user interaction to explore as many 
features as possible.  
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF EXECUTION TRACE FOR SIMULATED USER AND 
REAL-WORLD USER INTERACTIONS 
 Real-world User 
Interaction (A) 
Simulated User 
Interaction (B) 
 
Application MS Word MS Word 
Execution environment Real-world PC Real-world PC 
Execution time 8 hours 15 minutes 
Size of execution trace 129,108 KB 27,313 KB 
# of system calls obtained 955,463 180,614 
Extracted BOFM features 77 108 
# of common features 57 (74%) 57 (52.78%) 
 
Further, when selecting the benign applications for 
evaluation, we made sure that they were from one of the 
following functionally diverse categories: word processors 
(e.g., MS Word), text editors (e.g., MS Wordpad), command-
line shell (e.g., cmd.exe), web browser (e.g., Firefox), file 
transfer (e.g., Filezilla FTP server), remote access (e.g., Putty 
ssh client), e-mail (e.g., MS Outlook), IDE (e.g., MS Visual 
Studio),   media (e.g., VLC player), game (e.g., Chess Titans), 
anti-visus tool (e.g., AVG antivirus), VOIP (e.g., Skype), 
cloud storage (e.g., Dropbox), reader (e.g., Adobe PDF reader) 
and other utility tools (e.g., Google Desktop). We observed 
that execution traces of benign applications in the same 
category looked similar. For example, using BOFM, we 
managed to extract 66 features from ‘Notepad’ and 73 features 
from ‘WordPad’ execution traces, out of which 63 features 
were common to both applications. That is, 95.5% of Notepad 
features and 86.3% of WordPad features are identical. This 
indicates that, as long as we include a few benign applications 
from each category, it is sufficient to cover a wide range of 
benign applications in terms of functionality.  Thus, we can 
confidently say that our benign dataset of 100 applications (at 
least three from each category) is sufficiently representative to 
build classifiers to accurately predict malware, as it will be 
confirmed by our experimental results. It is also worth noting 
that in the literature, researchers have used very small benign 
dataset in the range of 5-18 applications [5] and that our 
experiment is much more extensive with that respect.   
Finally, as mentioned in Section VI, malware detection 
consists of two phases: model building and evaluation. To 
build the models, we used a training-set consisting of 
malware-train and execution traces of benign samples 
obtained from 4 (out of 5) machines. To evaluate the classifier 
models, we used a test-set consisting of malware-test and 
benign execution traces from the machine that was not used 
for training. This process is repeated five times where, on each 
iteration, the test-set consists of benign execution traces 
selected from a different machine. Due to space constraints, 
only averages, across the five experiments, are presented in 
the paper. Table 4 presents an overview of the benign and 
malware datasets used in our experiments.  
TABLE 4: OVERVIEW OF MALWARE AND BENIGN DATASETS 
 Malware Dataset Benign Dataset 
 
Total number of samples 5,300 100 
Execution environment Sandbox [11] Real-world PCs 
Max. size of an execution trace 37,416 KB 320,967 KB 
Min. size of an execution trace 17 KB 446 KB 
Avg. size of an execution trace 527 KB 56,544 KB 
Total no. of system calls  31,506,686 52,447,089 
Avg. # of system calls/sample 5,945 524,471 
 
B. Evaluation Measures 
We employ standard evaluation measures, including True 
Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and Total 
Accuracy, to evaluate the malware detection accuracy. We 
refer to definitions in [24] for further details but for the sake of 
completeness, we briefly explain them here. We can use the 
following contingency table to define the four possible 
outcomes (i.e., TP, FP, FN and TN) from a binary classifier. 
 
 
 
 
Predicted 
Outcome 
                      Actual Value 
 Malware Benign 
Malware 
True Positive  
(TP) 
False Positive 
(FP) 
Benign 
False Negative  
(FN) 
True Negative 
(TN) 
 
True Positive Rate (TPR) is in our context the proportion 
of malware samples correctly classified as malware. Similarly, 
False Positive Rate (FPR) is the proportion of benign samples 
misclassified as malware. Finally, Total Accuracy (or 
detection accuracy) measures the overall proportion of 
correctly classified instances, either malware or benign. These 
measures are formally defined as follows: 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF MALWARE DETECTION ACCURACY ACHIEVED BY LR 
AND SVM 
Classifier 
True Positive 
Rate/Counts 
False Positive 
Rate/Counts 
Total 
Accuracy/Counts 
 
LR 0.996/1494 0.01/1 0.996/1593 
SVM 0.994/1491 0.00/0 0.994/1591 
 
                                      
  
     
                                       
                                      
  
     
                                        
                       
     
           
                     
C. Experimental Setup 
All the experiments were executed using a 4 core Xeon(R) 
with 4 GB RAM machine installed with Ubuntu 12.04. In 
addition, a well known machine learning tool, WEKA [17], 
was used to build the malware detection classifiers. 
   
Next, we shall present and discuss the malware detection 
accuracy obtained by our framework. 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To assess the accuracy of our classifiers in detecting 
malicious code, we measured the True positive Rate, False 
Positive Rate and Total Accuracy achieved by BOFM for both 
logistic regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). 
As explained in Section VII.A, we used a training-set of 5000 
malware and 80 benign samples and a test-set of 300 malware 
and 20 benign samples. The experiment is repeated five times 
with different sets of benign samples in the test-set (refer 
Section VII.A for explanation), following a standard 5-fold 
cross validation process.  
The average results for LR and SVM, across all five 
experiments, are presented in Table 5 in the form of both rates 
and counts. From Table 5, it can be seen that both LR and 
SVM achieved similar detection accuracy. For LR, the slightly 
better detection accuracy of 99.6%, compared to 99.4% for 
SVM, comes at the cost of a 1% false positive rate. In malware 
detection, a lower (or zero) false positive rate is desired since 
the consequences of flagging a benign application as malware 
can be disastrous. For example, if a benign system file is 
flagged as malicious and deleted from the system, in the worst 
case, it may prevent the system from booting. Thus, we can 
conclude that SVM is a preferable solution to LR in our 
context.  
Since our original test-set contained a much higher 
proportion of malware, we needed to check this imbalance did 
not bias our results and ran the experiment again with a 
randomly selected, balanced subset (test-set 2). Test-set 2 
consists of 20 randomly selected (from a pool of 300 samples) 
malware samples and the 20 benign samples used in the 
original test-set. Again, we repeated the experiment five times 
following the same procedure as on the original data set and 
the averages across the five experiments were analyzed. SVM 
yielded a perfect accuracy of 100%, thus not misclassifying a 
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single program. However, LR achieved 99.5% detection 
accuracy with 1% false positive rate. Thus, based on these two 
experimental results, we can confirm that SVM performs 
relatively better than LR for malware detection. Further, the 
results also suggest that the accuracy of our overall approach 
based on BOFM is very encouraging. 
In addition, we also performed sensitivity analysis to 
investigate how individual OS resource types influence 
malware detection rates. That is, we repeated the above 
experiment six times, using test-set 2, where on each instance 
we considered features corresponding to an individual OS 
resource type. For sensitivity analysis, we used SVM as our 
classifier and Table 6 summarizes the outcomes. From Table 
6, it can be seen that for each OS resource type the false 
positive rate is unacceptably high. However, two OS resource 
types: file system and process/thread, managed to achieve a 
detection accuracy of 85% or greater with a false positive rate 
of 30% and 5%, respectively. Thus, we can conclude that 
features corresponding to individual OS resource types alone 
not sufficient for malware detection as they generate 
unacceptably high false positive rates. 
A. Feature Space Analysis 
In this section, we compare the features extracted from 
malware samples using BOFM and n-gram (n=2 or bigram) 
model, a simple behavior modeling technique. For this 
analysis, we considered 5000 malware samples that is used to 
train our classifier. One of the key aspects of BOFM is the 
bounded feature space, where the number of active features 
doesn’t grow in proportion with the number of samples (or 
size of execution trace) under evaluation. To visualize this 
characteristic of BOFM, in Figure 3(b), we have plotted the 
feature space or active features’ growth against malware 
sample sizes. From Figure 3(b), it can be seen that, for BOFM, 
the curve flattens as the number of malware samples increases. 
However, for bigram model (Figure 3(a)), the number of 
features grows proportionally with the number of malware 
samples under examination. It is also noted that a similar 
feature space growth trend is observed in other behavior 
modeling techniques such as n-bag and k-tuple. This illustrates 
the scalability of BOFM, against simple malware behavior 
models, in terms of feature space. 
In addition, in order to investigate whether our original 
hypothesis holds, we analyzed how benign and malware 
program behaviors differ in general. In Table 7, we 
summarized the number of common features as well as the 
unique features corresponding to malware and benign datasets. 
From Table 7, it can be seen that around 51% and 43% of the 
features appear to be common in benign and malware samples, 
respectively. Having 57% of unique malware features strongly 
supports our hypothesis and suggests that behavior-based 
malware analysis is a promising approach to detect malicious 
software. Next, we shall briefly analyze some of the 
interesting malware and benign features 
B. A Brief Analysis of Interesting Features 
Through our analysis, we find that certain actions drove 
malware predictions to a large extent. To be more specific, 
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
OS Resource Type Total Accuracy FP Rate 
 
File system 0.850 0.30 
Section 0.750 0.50 
Network 0.500 1.00 
Synchronization 0.750 0.50 
Process/Thread 0.975 0.05 
Registry  0.750 0.50 
 
TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF FEATURE SPACES 
 Malware Dataset Benign Dataset 
 
Common features 243 (42.71%) 243 (50.63%) 
Unique features 326 (57.29%) 237 (49.37%) 
Total features 569 (100%) 480 (100%) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Feature space growth of malware samples: (a) using bigram 
(n=2) model, and (b) using BOFM 
 
NotifyChangeKey action (i.e., action that allows the running 
application to request notification for a registry key change 
[29]) is very widely used by malware samples when compared 
to benign samples. That is, around 86% (4,311/5,000) of 
malware applications performed NotifyChangeKey action on 
registry resource whereas only 15% (15/100) of benign 
applications performed it. Further, DeleteKey and 
DeleteValue actions (i.e., actions that delete keys and values 
from the registry, respectively) also played a significant role in 
distinguishing malware from benign applications. This 
behavior is expected as registry contains the system 
configuration settings and malware often create (or modify) 
registry keys and values to maintain persistence on the 
infected system, allowing the malware to survive reboots. For 
example, modification to the registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE 
\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, allows the mal-
ware to automatically run every time when the Windows is 
started.  
In addition, with regards to file resource, we find that there 
are several features such as {CreateFile, SetFileInformation, 
DeviceControl, ReadFile, WriteFile} that widely appeared in 
malware samples. Similarly, several features corresponding to 
process/thread resource predominantly appeared in malware 
samples. For example, {CreateThread, QueryInformation-
Process, SetInformationProcess} feature appeared in 
67.2% (3361/5000) of malware samples and only 4% (4/100) 
of benign applications. However, several other features such 
as {OpenFile, QueryAttributesFile} and {CreateMutex, 
ReleaseMutex} seemed to be too common, where they 
appeared in almost all the malware and benign applications. 
C. Comparison with Canali et al. 
As discussed in Section II, Canali et al. [5], in their recent 
study, proposed several malware behavior modeling 
techniques for malware detection. Their experiment results 
revealed that the optimal behavior model, 2-bags of 2-tuples of 
action with arguments, achieved a 99% detection rate with a 
false positive rate of 0.4%. Using SVM to build a classifier, 
BOFM achieved 99.4% detection accuracy with no false 
positives and therefore improves the already accurate results 
of Canali et al. [5]. Since our benign sample is different from 
theirs (due to privacy reasons), this result should be interpreted 
with care but is nevertheless encouraging. More importantly, 
such improvement is obtained despite a dramatic size 
reduction in the malware feature space, as discussed next. 
Canali et al. [5], on average, generated more than one 
million malware features (i.e., signatures) for each one of 
these models, whereas BOFM generated only 569 features 
(i.e., active features). As listed in Section II, the feature space 
size (or number of signatures) is one of the key characteristics 
determining the practicality and scalability of a malware 
detector. In BOFM, we achieve this by limiting our total 
number of features to be a constant number N, whereas in [5], 
the feature space is not constant and grows proportionally to 
the size of execution traces. 
To get a better insight into the feature space problem in 
Canali et al. [5], let us assume an execution trace with just 100 
unique actions with arguments, for example, there are 12 
unique actions with arguments in the malware execution trace 
shown in Figure 1. The simplest malware behavior model: 4-
bags of actions with arguments, generates a feature space of 
size  
   
 
           . This is very large and the number of 
features heavily depends on the unique actions present in 
every single execution trace. This problem is even more acute 
for other models, such as 2-tuples of actions with arguments 
and 2-bags of 2-tuples of actions with arguments, presented in 
[5]. 
In addition, approaches in [5] have high memory 
requirements and long execution times to perform signature 
matching, whereas we were able to run standard machine 
learning algorithms on a standard PC in less than a minute. To 
be more specific, in [5], it took almost 48 hours to extract 
malware features using tuples of system calls with arguments, 
whereas, using BOFM, we were able to extract features in 
1.67 hours from the same set of malware samples. Note that 
our experiments were conducted using a single 4-core Xeon 
(R) machine with 4GB of RAM, in contrast to [5] where the 
authors used two clusters: one with eight 4-core Xeon (R) 
machines with 16GB of RAM and a second one with eight 16-
core Authentic AMD machines with 45GB of RAM. Further, 
we were able to train the SVM classifier, using our training-
set, in 26 seconds (averaged over 5 executions), consuming 
only 200 MB of physical memory (average memory space). In 
contrast, Canali et al. [5] reported that their prototype malware 
detector was unable to run on a standard machine due to the 
huge feature space, as it consumed 1GB of RAM to perform 
matching on 5 million signatures. 
This suggests that BOFM, beyond improvements in 
accuracy, is also much more efficient and scalable. Further, 
our approach does not require any complex parameter tuning 
or preprocessing. From all the above, we can therefore 
conclude that BOFM, when combined with machine learning 
algorithms, is indeed a more practical solution than the 
behavior modeling approaches reported in [5] and other 
related works, as discussed in Section II.  
IX. CONCLUSION  
This paper proposes a novel malware detection solution 
that combines a new malware behavior modeling technique 
(BOFM) and machine learning, in order to distinguish 
malware from benign programs. Our goal is to be sufficiently 
efficient, scalable, and accurate to complement traditional 
anti-virus software on end host machines. Our detection 
models cannot be easily evaded by simple obfuscation 
techniques as we characterize the behavior of malware as a set 
of high-level actions that models the interaction between 
malware and the operating system resources in a systematic 
manner. Further, the feature space generated by BOFM is of 
fixed dimension and does not grow in proportion with the 
number of malware samples under examination. This makes 
BOFM more efficient and scalable in practice. In addition, in 
spite of all these practical advantages, when combining BOFM 
and Support Vector Machines, a well-known machine learning 
approach, we obtain a better detection accuracy—including no 
false positives—than reported malware detection techniques.  
But more importantly, given the usual difficulties in 
comparing accuracy across studies, such results are obtained 
with vastly lower computation times and memory usage, thus 
demonstrating the improved scalability and efficiency of our 
approach.  
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